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Abstract
This paper estimates labor supply elasticities of married men and women allowing for
heterogeneity among couples (by educational attainments of husbands and wives) and mod-
eling explicitly how household members interact and make their labor supply decisions. We
find that the labor supply decisions of husbands and wives depend on each other, unless
both spouses are highly educated (college or above). For high–educated couples, the labor
supply decisions of husband and wife are jointly determined only if they have pre–school
children. We also find that labor supply elasticities differ greatly among households. The
participation own wage elasticity is largest (0.77) for low–educated women married to low
educated men, and smallest (0.03) for high–educated women married to low educated men.
The own wage elasticities for low educated women married to high–educated men and for
high–educated women married to high–educated men are similar and fall between these two
extremes (about 0.30). For all types of couples, participation elasticity of non–labor family
income is small. We also find that cross wage elasticities for married women are relatively
small (less than -0.05) if they are married to low educated men and larger (-0.37) if they are
married to high–educated men. Allowing for heterogeneity across couples yields an overall
participation wage elasticity of 0.56, a cross wage elasticity of -0.13 and an income elastic-
ity of -0.006 for married women. The analysis in this paper provides a natural framework
to study how changes in educational attainments and household structure affect aggregate
labor supply elasticities.
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1 Introduction
Estimates of labor supply elasticities have a central place in empirical research in labor
economics (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Keane (2011) provide extensive surveys
of this literature). This is not surprising given the key role labor supply elasticities
play in policy analysis, e.g. taxation, and in models of macroeconomic fluctuations.1
With few notable exceptions, e.g. Lundberg (1988), however, the empirical literature
studies labor supply elasticities of males or females without allowing the possibility
that husbands’ and wives’ labor supply decisions affect each other. Furthermore, labor
supply elasticities are usually estimated for males or females as a group, and as a
result labor supply decisions, and hence, labor supply elasticities, do not depend on
educational attainment of females, or relative education levels of husbands and wives
(i.e. who is married with whom).
While the empirical studies on labor supply elasticities do not usually contemplate in-
teractions between household members, a growing, theoretical and empirical literature
on household decision making emphasizes the importance of modeling households as
a collection of individuals, each with his/her own utility function.2 The conventional
unitary model, which considers the family as a single decision unit has received little
empirical support and it’s theoretical foundations have been questioned. Several pa-
pers have proposed alternative models of family labor supply decision to incorporate
preferences of different individuals living in the same household and to explain the
interaction between family members. The alternative models include the cooperative
bargaining models suggested by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981), collective approach proposed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and non-cooperative
models developed by Konrad and Lommerud (1995).
This paper estimates labor supply elasticities of married men and women allowing
for heterogeneity among couples (by educational attainment of husbands and wives)
and modeling explicitly how household members interact and make their labor supply
decisions. Our questions are: How do husbands and wives interact when they decide
their labor supply? Do families differ in the way they make their labor supply decisions?
How do these differences affect labor supply elasticities of different households?
1See, Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber (2011), Keane (2011) and Keane and Rogerson (2012).
2There a few studies in the empirical literature, e.g. Hausman and Ruud (1984), Kooreman and
Kapteyn (1990), and Ransom (1987), that estimate the joint family labor supply. However, in all these
studies, the household is considered as a single decision-maker and preferences of household members
are represented by a joint household utility function.
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We focus on the static labor supply decision of couples along the extensive margin.
Couples differ in the education levels of husbands and wives, as well as the way they
take their labor supply decisions. In particular, we consider two educational categories,
below and above college degree (low and high). Since there are two education groups,
we distinguish four types of couples: (i) low–educated husband and wife (homogamy–
low) (ii) high–educated husband and low–educated wife (heterogamy–husband high)
(iii) low–educated husband and high–educated wife (heterogamy–wife high), and (iv)
high–educated husband and wife (homogamy-high). Once we move away from the
standard unitary model and also allow for interactions between husbands and wives,
we need to specify the way husbands and wives make their employment decisions.
We consider five models of household decision making behavior: (i) a model with-
out interactions between spouses’ decisions, (ii) a non–cooperative Nash model, (iii) a
Stackelberg model with the husband as the leader, (iv) a Stackelberg model with the
wife as the leader, and (v) a mixed model of Pareto-optimality and Nash equilibrium.
Using data from the 2000 U.S. Census, we estimate the parameters of each of these
models for each type of households using a maximum likelihood estimation strategy.
Then, given the parameter estimates, we select the model that predicts best the ob-
served labor supply behavior of a particular couple in the sample. As a result, for
each type of household, we know the fraction of couples that follows of a particular
decision making process. Once we assign a particular decision making process for each
household, we calculate labor supply elasticities of household members.
Our results show that couples differ in the way they make their labor supply deci-
sions. The labor supply decisions of husbands and wives exhibit strong interactions
unless both of the spouses are high–educated. In particular, for more than 48% of
homogamy-low and heterogamy couples, the joint labor supply decisions of husbands
and wives are determined by Stackelberg–wife leader game, whereas for 20% of the
household decisions are predicted best by Nash/Pareto optimality model. The remain-
ing homogamy-low and heterogamy type couples make their joint labor supply decision
either independently, or following a non–cooperative Nash game or a Stackelberg–
husband leader game. For homogamous–high couples, on the other hand, more than
45% of household decisions can be justified as coming from a model without interac-
tions between spouses and more than 26% of household decisions as coming from a
Nash game. The joint labor supply decision of remaining homogamy-high type couples
are determined either by a Stackelberg leader game or Nash/Pareto optimality model.
When we also consider the presence of children, we find that labor supply decisions of
spouses are more likely to be independent of each other if there are no children of pre–
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school age in the household. The presence of children matter most for homogamy–high
couples. While without children, we do not observe any interactions for majority of
households, with children their employment decisions follow a non–cooperative Nash
game.
Moreover, the labor supply elasticities of married women of different types vary to
a great extent when the heterogeneity is taken into account. The participation own
wage elasticity is largest (0.77) for low–educated women married to low educated men,
and smallest (0.03) for high–educated women married to low educated men. The own
wage elasticities for low educated women married to high–educated men and for high–
educated women married to high–educated men are similar and fall between these two
extremes (about 0.30). We find that for all types of couples, participation elasticity of
non–labor family income is rather small. We also find that cross wage elasticities for
married women are relatively small (less than -0.05) if they are married to low educated
men and larger (-0.37) if they are married to high–educated men.
Allowing for heterogeneity across couples yields an overall participation wage elasticity
of 0.56, a cross wage elasticity of -0.13 and an income elasticity of -0.006 for married
women. These elasticities are larger than the recent estimates of labor supply elastici-
ties of married women (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2007; Heim, 2007).3 The current analysis
differ from these studies as we allow for household interactions and we let these inter-
actions differ across different types of households. Our analysis show that just allowing
for household interactions –allowing for differences among couples in the way they make
their labor supply decisions– while ignoring heterogeneity among households generates
a lower labor supply wage elasticity (about 0.25) and higher labor supply cross wage
(-0.24) and non–labor income (-0.006) elasticities for married women.
The results of this study has important implications for policy analysis. Since, many
policies are designed to target specific groups, it is essential to understand the potential
impacts on labor supply of different individuals. For instance, U.S. income transfer
and tax policies –such as earned income tax credit (EITC) or Temporary Assistance for
Family Needs (TAFN) programs– target to encourage work among low–income families
or families with children.4 The differences in labor supply elasticities of married women
3Heim (2007) shows that married women’s participation wage elasticity declined from 0.66 to 0.03
and the participation income elasticity declined from -0.13 to -0.05 between 1979 and 2003 in the
U.S. Blau and Kahn (2007) find that participation own wage elasticity of married women fell from
0.53–0.61 in 1980, to 0.41–0.44 in 1990, and to only 0.27–0.30 by 2000. The effect of spouse wages on
participation also fell from -0.20 to -0.24 in 1980 to -0.11 to -0.13 in 2000, with most of the decline
occurring over the 1980s.
4Since, estimates of labor supply elasticities are of key interest to policymakers, a substantial
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based on the spouses’ education levels is a dimension that has been overlooked by the
literature. Earlier studies mostly focus on the heterogeneity associated to the presence
of pre–school children (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey). We further
show that differential responses of married women based on the spouses’ education
levels are present among married women, independent of whether children are present
in the household or not.
Over the last decades, there has been dramatic changes in the educational composition
of population in the U.S. Not only the educational attainment levels of men and women
increased, but also the resemblance of husbands and wives on educational attainment
increased substantially (Mare 1991; Pencavel 1998; Schwartz and Mare 2005).5 The
variation in labor supply elasticities of married women raises a natural question: What
is the impact of compositional changes in population on women’s overall labor supply
elasticities? In order to get an idea of the effect of compositional changes on the
married women’s labor supply responsiveness we carry out a counterfactual exercise.
We calculate what the overall labor supply elasticities would be, if the married women
had the responsiveness of 2000 but the distribution of couples would have been as of
1980s. We find a participation own wage elasticity of 0.63, a participation cross wage
elasticity of -0.11 and a participation non–labor income of -0.004. This implies that,
although, compositional changes do not have a considerable effect on the participation
cross wage and participation non–labor income elasticities of married women, changing
composition of couples accounts for a decline in participation own wage elasticity of
married women –from 0.63 to 0.56– between 1980 and 2000.
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, it is naturally related to the
large empirical literature that provides empirical estimates of labor supply elasticities of
married women. Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) are recent examples of papers
in this group. Both studies find a decline in women’s labor supply elasticities over the
last decades. The decline in the labor supply elasticities of married women have been
attributed to the increasing marriage instability and increasing work opportunities
for women (Goldin, 1990; Blau and Kahn, 2007). However, marriage instability and
work opportunities of women depend on educational attainment of women and also
macroeconomic literature concerned about modeling labor supply decision of married men and women
to study optimal taxation policies. Recent examples of this literature includes Alesina, Ichino, and
Karabarbounis (2011) and Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2012a and 2012b).
5Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos (2012) develop a model of marriage, divorce, educa-
tional attainment and married female labor-force participation to understand the increase in assorta-
tive mating, and the differences in the fall in marriage and the rise in divorce in the U.S. They show
that technological progress in the household sector and changes in the wage structure are important
for explaining these facts.
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educational similarity of spouses.6 Since factors that might affect the labor supply
responsiveness of married women differ by educational attainment and educational
similarity of spouses, it is natural to think so does the labor supply responsiveness.
In addition, Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) abstract from the interactions
between household members. There are few empirical studies estimated joint labor
supply of husbands and wives as opposed to individual labor supply, examples are
by Hausman and Ruud (1984), Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990), Lundberg (1988) and
Ransom (1987). However, except Lundberg (1988), the estimates of these studies are
based on a unitary model without considering the nature of households interactions.
Lundberg (1988) tests alternative theories of family labor supply behavior and considers
the role of presence of young children on household interactions. However, she abstracts
from the labor supply decisions along the extensive margin.
Second, this paper is related to the literature that study household interactions. The
models that we employ to estimate labor supply elasticity for women come from non-
cooperative and cooperative models.7 In non-cooperative models, developed by Ulph
(1988) and Konrad and Lommerud (1995), each individual within a household maxi-
mize their own utility, relative to their own budget constraints, taking the actions of
other household members as given and hence equilibrium is self-enforcing (Chen and
Woolley, 2001). Cooperative approach includes cooperative bargaining models sug-
gested by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) and collective
models developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992). The collective approach suppose that
household decisions are Pareto-efficient. Cooperative bargaining models, which is a
particular case of collective models, represent household allocations as the outcome
of some specific bargaining process and cooperative allocation reached depends cru-
cially on the threat point, i.e. what happens in case of disagreement among couples.8
Based on this literature, we consider two equilibrium concepts, non–cooperative Nash
and Stackelberg leader game, and the approach which imposes Pareto optimality of
6Earlier studies show that high–educated women have lower marital dissolution rates than other
women (Bumpass, Martin and Sweet, 1991; Martin, 2006). Moreover, the marriage instability is
higher for couples with dissimilar education levels than couples with similar education levels (Martin,
2006; Tzeng, 1992). The direction and the magnitude of the effect depend on which spouse is more
educated (Bitter, 1986; Bumpass, Martin and Sweet, 1991). On the other hand, highly educated
women have gained the most, in terms of labor market opportunities, and labor force gains have been
largest for wives married to highly educated and high earning husbands (Cohen and Bianchi, 1998;
Juhn and Murphy, 1997).
7A large empirical industrial organization literature use game-theoretic models to build structural
econometric models of entry, exit and market concentration. See Berry and Reiss (2007) for a review.
8Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) use divorce as the threat point while
Lundberg and Pollak (1993), Haddad and Kanbur (1994), Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Chen
and Woolley (2001) use some form of non-cooperative behavior as the threat point.
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observed decisions of husbands and wives. We do not impose the restriction that all
couples decide their labor supply in the same way and allow for the possibility that
husband–wife interactions may differ across couples.
Finally, our paper is related to recent papers in empirical labor literature that allow
for heterogeneity in household decision making or household interactions. Jia (2005)
analyze the labor supply decision of retiring couples in Norway and assumes that there
are two type of families, cooperative and non-cooperative households. Her results
show that more than half of the households are of the non-cooperative type. Similarly,
Eckstein and Lifshitz (2012) considers two type of families while modeling labor supply
of husbands and wives, modern and classical. They assume that classical household
follows a Stackelberg leader game in which the wife’s labor supply decision follows her
husband’s already-known employment outcome, while the modern family plays a Nash
game. They estimate that 38% of families are modern type and the participation rate of
women in those households is almost 80%. Different than Eckstein and Lifshitz (2013),
we consider education level and educational match as the source of heterogeneity and
do not assume a certain structure in decision making a priori. In addition, we provide
empirical estimates of labor supply elasticities for married women.
2 Modeling Family Labor Supply
We focus on the static labor supply decisions of husbands and wives along the extensive
margin. To this end, let yh and yw be the participation decisions of the husband and
the wife, respectively. The participation decisions of the husband and the wife are
defined as
yh =
{
1 if the husband works
0 otherwise
and yw =
{
1 if the wife works
0 otherwise.
We assume that each spouse maximizes his or her utility. However, husband’s and
wife’s decisions are interdependent, such that each individual’s employment decision
is affected by his or her spouse’s decision. Let Uh(yh, yw) denote the husband’s utility
of taking action yh if his wife takes action yw, and Uw(yh, yw) be the wife’s utility of
taking action yw if her husband takes action yh. Following McFadden (1974, 1981)
the individual utilities, Uh(yh, yw) and Uw(yh, yw), are treated random and decomposed
into deterministic and random components. Assumption A.1 states this formally:
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Assumption A.1
Uh(yh, yw) = Vh(yh, yw) + ηh(yh, yw)
Uw(yh, yw) = Vw(yh, yw) + ηw(yh, yw),
where for i = h,w, Vi(yh, yw) is the deterministic component and ηi(yh, yw) is the
random component of the individual utility. Furthermore, we make the following sim-
plifying assumption on random components:
Assumption A.2
ηh(1, 1)− ηh(0, 1) = ηh(1, 0)− ηh(0, 0) = εh
ηw(1, 1)− ηw(1, 0) = ηw(0, 1)− ηw(0, 0) = εw,
where (εh, εw) are normally distributed with zero means, unit variances and correlation
ρ. Assumption A.2 states that the difference in random utility that an individual
derives from working versus not working when his or her spouse works equals to the
difference in random utility the individual derives from working versus not working
when his or her spouse does not work. Hence, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in utility derived from working through the εh and εw. The assumption of εh and εw to
be correlated implies that in a particular couple, there are common unobserved factors
between spouses affecting the husband’s and wife’s utilities of working.
Finally, we assume that the change in individual’s deterministic utility associated to a
change in spouse’s action is constant. This is summarized in the following assumption:
Assumption A.3
Vh(1, 1)− Vh(0, 1) = αh + Vh(1, 0)− Vh(0, 0)
Vw(1, 1)− Vw(1, 0) = αw + Vw(0, 1)− Vw(0, 0).
Since, by Assumption A.1, the random utility of working versus not working is the
same whether the spouse works or not, Assumption A.2 implies that the change in
individual’s utility associated to a change in spouse’s action is also constant. Hence,
we rule out the second order effects of spouse’s employment on individual’s utility.
For empirical implementation, the deterministic component of individual’s utility is
assumed to be a linear function of individual’s observable characteristics, xh and xw,
such that Vh(1, 1) − Vh(0, 1) = x′hβh and Vw(1, 1) − Vw(0, 1) = x′wβw. Hence, together
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with assumptions A.1 to A.3, the model is parametrized as
Uh(1, 1) = x
′
hβ
1
h + α
1
h + η
1
h Uw(1, 1) = x
′
wβ
1
w + α
1
w + η
1
w
Uh(0, 1) = x
′
hβ
0
h + α
0
h + η
0
h Uw(1, 0) = x
′
wβ
0
w + α
0
w + η
0
w
Uh(1, 0) = x
′
hβ
1
h + η
1
h Uw(0, 1) = x
′
wβ
1
w + η
1
w
Uh(0, 0) = x
′
hβ
0
h + η
0
h Uw(0, 0) = x
′
wβ
0
w + η
0
w, (1)
where β1i − β0i = βi, α1i − α0i = αi and η1i − η0i = εi for i = w, h.
In family labor supply model, the utility or the payoff of working can be interpreted
as the market wages and the utility or the payoff of not working as the reservation
wage of the individual. Since, an individual’s utility depends on spouse’s employment
decision, there are two pairs of wage equations describing the market and reservation
wage of the individuals.
Consider first wife’s decision whether to work or not, i.e. yw ∈ {0, 1}. For yw = 1,
Uh(0, 1) denotes the reservation wage of the husband when his wife works. Similarly,
for yw = 0, Uh(0, 0) is his reservation wage when the wife does not work. Hence, the
difference between Uh(0, 1) and Uh(0, 0) captures the impact of wife’s employment on
husband’s reservation wage and it is denoted by α0h. On the other hand, for yw = 1,
Uh(1, 1) is the market wage of the husband when his wife works. When the wife does
not work, i.e. yw = 0, Uh(1, 0) gives the market wage of the husband. Note that
the difference between Uh(1, 1) and Uh(1, 0) implies an affect of wife’s employment on
husband’s reservation wage and it is denoted by α1h. For the wife, the wage equations
are written analogously. For yh ∈ {0, 1}, Uw(yh, 0) represents wife’s reservation wage
and Uw(yh, 1) is her market wage. Hence for the wife, α
0
w and α
1
w denote the impact
of husband’s employment on wife’s reservation wage and market wage, respectively.
Although, economic theory suggests that spouse’ employment would affect individual’s
reservation wage, not his or her market wage, one can test the presence of both effects
by including both α0i and α
1
i (for i = h,w) in the model and testing the significance of
these parameters. Therefore, we include the impact of spouse’s employment decision
on the individual’s market wage (α1h and α
1
w) in the model without imposing any a
priori restriction that this effect is equal to zero.
To complete the family labor supply model, it is crucial to determine how the observed
dichotomous variables yh and yw are generated. A natural way to formulate the family
labor supply is a model of simultaneous probit model that adapts the latent variable
approach in single-person discrete choice models to accommodate the labor supply
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decisions of both spouses.9 The extension of single-person discrete choice model to the
multiple–person choice model suggests that the observed dichotomous variables (yh
and yw) are generated according to the following rule:
yh =
{
1 if y∗h ≥ 0
0 otherwise
and yw =
{
1 if y∗w ≥ 0
0 otherwise,
where
y∗h = yw[Uh(1, 1)− Uh(0, 1)] + (1− yw)[Uh(1, 0)− Uh(0, 0)],
and
y∗w = yh[Uw(1, 1)− Uw(0, 1)] + (1− yh)[Uw(1, 0)− Uw(0, 0)]. (2)
Equation 2 states that, for a given employment decision of the spouse, the individual
decides whether to work or not based on a simple utility comparison. Under the
assumptions A.1 to A.3, and model parametrization in Equation 1, it follows that
y∗h = x
′
hβh + αhyw + εh
y∗w = x
′
wβw + αwyh + εw, (3)
where (εh, εw), as stated above, have a bivariate standard normal distribution with
correlation ρ.
Given Equation 3, husband’s and wife’s utility comparisons, as a result the probability
of different outcomes to arise, can be written in terms of conditions on the random
components εh and εw. Therefore, the probability of each four possible outcome for the
joint labor supply decision of a couple –both spouses work, only husband works, only
wife works or both spouses do not work– can be expressed in terms of model parameters.
Table 1 presents the conditions on the husband’s and wife’s utility comparisons and the
conditions that must be satisfied by the random components for each possible outcome
to arise.
For instance, for a given employment decision of the wife yw, the husband works if
his utility of working, Uh(1, yw), is greater than his utility of not working, Uh(0, yw).
Similarly, the wife works based on the comparison between Uw(1, yw) and Uw(0, yw)
9See Maddala (1974) for alternative formulations of simultaneous equations for dummy endogenous
variables based on the latent variable approach.
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Table 1: Conditions for observed outcomes in simultaneous probit model
Husband’s and Wife’s actions Utility Comparison Condition
yh = 1 and yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1) and εh > −x′hβh − αh and
Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0) εw > −x′wβw − αw
yh = 1 and yw = 0 Uh(1, 0) > Uh(0, 0) and εh > −x′hβh and
Uw(1, 0) > Uw(1, 1) εw < −x′wβw − αw
yh = 0 and yw = 1 Uh(0, 1) > Uh(1, 1) and εh < −x′hβh − αh and
Uw(0, 1) > Uw(0, 0) εw > −x′wβw
yh = 0 and yw = 0 Uh(0, 0) > Uh(1, 0) and εh < −x′hβh and
Uw(0, 0) > Uw(0, 1) εw < −x′wβw
for a given employment decision of her husband yh. Hence, for a particular couple,
the probability that both spouses work, i.e. (yh, yw) = (1, 1), equals to the probability
that Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1) and Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0). However, the utility comparisons,
Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1) and Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0) can only arise if certain conditions on
the random components εh and εw are satisfied. In particular, given Equation 3,
Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1) and Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0) will only hold if εh > −x′hβh − αh and
εw > −x′wβw−αw. Hence, the probability that both spouses work, i.e. (yh, yw) = (1, 1)
equals to the probability that εh > −x′hβh−αh and εw > −x′wβw −αw. Therefore, the
probability of (yh, yw) = (1, 1) can be expressed in terms of model parameters.
The multiple-person choice models differ from single-person models since they include
simultaneity among individuals’ decisions (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). A well known
difficulty with the simultaneous probit model is that, the relationship between (εh, εw)
and (yh, yw) defined by the model is not one to one. In particular, the sum of the
probabilities of observed outcomes either exceeds one or is less than one depending on
the sign of the αh × αw. Therefore, the model described in Equation 3 is incoherent
and incomplete.10 For instance, if αh×αw ≥ 0, there is a region R ⊂ εh×εw, where the
model delivers multiple solutions for yh and yw for the same set of parameter values,
i.e. the model is incomplete. Hence, the sum of the probabilities of four mutually
exclusive possible outcomes –(1, 1),(1, 0),(0, 1) and (0, 0)– exceeds one. On the other
hand, if αh×αw < 0, the model is incoherent for the region R ⊂ εh×εw, i.e. there is no
solution for yh and yw. In this case, the sum of the probabilities of possible outcomes
10See Figure A.1. of Appendix A for details.
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is less than one.
The simultaneous probit model to be coherent, one needs to impose the condition
αh × αw = 0, which essentially eliminates the simultaneity from the model (e.g. Heck-
man, 1978). However, simultaneity is crucial for allowing the possibility that husband’s
and wife’s labor supply decisions affect each other. To consider the interdependence of
husband’s and wife’s employment decisions, an alternative is to impose more structure
to the model. The models developed by Bjorn and Vuong (1984, 1985) and Koore-
man (1994) ensure the completeness and coherency without imposing the coherency
restrictions. In this setting, instead of the rule described in Equation 2, the observed
dichotomous variables yh and yw are assumed to be the outcome of a static discrete
game played between two agents.
Bjorn and Vuong (1984) use the non-cooperative Nash concept and assume that the
observed dichotomous variables are the Nash Equilibrium outcomes of a game played
between players. Bjorn and Vuong (1985) propose a model that uses the Stackelberg
equilibrium concept in which the outcomes of the sequential decision-making problem
are generated as Stackelberg equilibrium of a game played between players. Since
the game theoretical models may yield outcomes that are not Pareto optimal, Koore-
man (1994) suggests an alternative approach that is based on the Nash principle but
ensures that the outcome is always Pareto optimal. In our analysis, we employ the
game–theoretical models suggested by Bjorn and Vuong (1984, 1985) and Kooreman
(1994) in addition to the simultaneous probit model by imposing the coherency con-
dition (αh = αw = 0). We compare game–theoretical models that allows for the
interdependence of husband’s and wife’s employment decisions with the model with-
out interactions between spouses’ decisions, namely simultaneous probit model with
coherency condition imposed.
2.1 Nash Model
For modeling family labor supply, we assume that each individual maximizes his or her
utility given the employment decision of the spouse. Hence, a natural framework to
model the family labor supply is a game played between spouses. In the Nash model,
observed decisions of the husband and the wife, yh and yw, are assumed to be the
outcomes of a non–cooperative game played between spouses.
In the Nash game, husband and wife decide their labor supply simultaneously. Hence,
each possible decision of the spouse leads to a reaction function for the individual. Since
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there are four possible outcomes of the game –both spouses work, only husband works,
only wife works or both spouses do not work– each spouse has four possible reaction
functions. These reaction functions are (i) always decide not to work (ii) always take
the same action as the spouse (iii) always take the opposite action of the spouse, and
(iv) always decide to work. As the roles of the spouses in this game are symmetric, the
reaction functions of the husband and the wife are identical. We denote the reaction
functions of the husband with H1, H2, H3 and H4, and the reaction functions of the
wife with W1,W2,W3 and W4. The reaction functions for the husband and the wife are
summarized in the first columns of Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
Each reaction function for an individual will arise, i.e. will be the best response,
if certain conditions on utility comparisons hold. Second columns of Table 2 and
Table 3, summarize the utility comparisons of the husband and the wife for their
corresponding reaction functions. Each utility comparison, however, can only arise if
certain conditions on the random components εh and εw are satisfied. We use model
parametrization in Equation 1 to determine the conditions on the random components
that must be satisfied for each reaction function to arise. These conditions are provided
in the third columns of Tables 2 and 3. For instance, the reaction function H1 says that
husband always chooses not to work, whether wife works or does not work (column 1 of
Table 2). The reaction function H1 arises, if for the husband the utility of not working is
greater than the utility of working for any decision of the wife, i.e. Uh(1, yw) < Uh(0, yw)
for yw = 0, 1 (column 2 of Table 2). The condition on the random component εh
for utility comparison Uh(1, 1) < Uh(0, 1) and Uh(1, 0) < Uh(0, 0) is εh < −x′hβh −
max(0, αh) (column 3 of Table 2).
Table 2: Husband’s reaction functions
Reaction function Utility Comparison Condition
H1: yh = 0 if yw = 0 and Uh(1, 0) < Uh(0, 0) and εh < −x′hβh −max(0, αh)
yh = 0 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) < Uh(0, 1)
H2: yh = 0 if yw = 0 and Uh(1, 0) < Uh(0, 0) and −x′hβh − αh < εh < −x′hβh if αh ≥ 0
yh = 1 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1)
H3: yh = 1 if yw = 0 and Uh(1, 0) > Uh(0, 0) and −x′hβh < εh < −x′hβh − αh if αh < 0
yh = 0 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) < Uh(0, 1)
H4: yh = 1 if yw = 0 and Uh(1, 0) > Uh(0, 0) and εh > −x′hβh −min(0, αh)
yh = 1 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1)
Given the reaction functions of the husband and the wife, the Nash Equilibrium in
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Table 3: Wife’s reaction functions
Reaction function Utility Comparison Condition
W1: yw = 0 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) < Uw(0, 0) and εw < −x′wβw −max(0, αw)
yw = 0 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) < Uw(1, 0)
W2: yw = 0 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) < Uw(0, 0) and −x′wβw − αw < εw < −x′wβw if αw > 0
yw = 1 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0)
W3: yw = 1 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) > Uw(0, 0) and −x′wβw < εw < −x′wβw − αw if αw < 0
yw = 0 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) < Uw(1, 0)
W4: yw = 1 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) > Uw(0, 0) and εw > −x′wβw −min(0, αw)
yw = 1 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0)
pure strategies (hereinafter NE) can be defined. Table 4 presents the NE for each of
the pairs of reaction functions. For instance, for the pair (H1,W4), there is a unique
NE, that is (0,1), i.e. husband chooses not to work and wife chooses to work. As seen
in Table 4, in some cases, there are multiple Nash equilibria and in some others, there
is no NE in pure strategies.
Table 4: Nash Equilibria in pure strategies
Husband/Wife W1 W2 W3 W4
H1 (0,0) (0,0) (0,1) (0,1)
H2 (0,0) (0,0) or (1,1) No NE (1,1)
H3 (1,0) No NE (0,1) or (1,0) (0,1)
H4 (1,0) (1,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Following Bjorn and Vuong (1984), we assume that one of the equilibria is chosen by
the couple with equal probabilities in case of multiple equilibria. In case of no Nash
equilibrium, the couple is assumed to choose one of the possible alternatives with equal
probabilities. For instance, the outcome (yh, yw) = (0, 1), i.e. husband does not work
and wife works, is the NE, if the pair of husband’s and wife’s reaction functions is
(H1,W3), or (H1,W4), or (H3,W4). In addition, the NE of the game will be (0,1) with
a probability 1/2 if the pair of husband’s and wife’s reaction functions is (H3,W3) and
with a probability 1/4 if the pair of husband’s and wife’s reaction functions is (H3,W2).
Hence, the probability of the outcome (yh, yw) = (0, 1) to be NE of the game, can be
written as the sum of probabilities of husband’s and wife’s reaction functions pairs to
arise. Given Tables 2 to 4, the probability of each four possible outcome for the joint
labor supply decision of a couple –both spouses work, only husband works, only wife
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works or both spouses do not work– can be expressed in terms of conditions on the
random components εh and εw, i.e. model parameters.
11
2.2 Stackelberg Leader Model
The labor supply decision of couples can also be reformulated by using a different equi-
librium concept, that is of Stackelberg–leader game. In this case, yh and yw are assumed
to be the Stackelberg leader equilibrium (hereinafter SE) outcomes of a sequential game
played between players. In this game, one of the players (leader) moves first and then
the other player (follower) moves sequentially. Hence, the roles of players are asymmet-
ric. The leader is assumed to maximize his or her utility anticipating the reaction of
the follower. In other words, the leader takes into account the payoff of the follower in
making his or her decision. Since in family labor supply, the roles of husband and wife
are not known a prior, we consider two versions of Stackelberg leader game played be-
tween spouses, one husband being the Stackelberg leader (Stackelberg–husband leader)
and another one wife being the Stackelberg leader (Stackelberg–wife leader). In this
section, we explain briefly the Stackelberg model assuming the wife is the Stackelberg
leader and her husband is the follower. The description of Stackelberg–husband leader
model can be derived analogously.12
In Stackelberg–wife leader game, wife takes into account the four possible reaction
functions of her husband, H1, H2, H3, and H4 when she makes her decision. The
reaction functions of the husband are described in Table 5 (column 1). For example,
the reaction function H1 says that the husband will always choose not to work whether
the wife works or not. In this case, for any possible action that wife can take, the utility
of not working is greater for the husband than the utility of working, i.e. Uh(0, 1) >
Uh(1, 1) and Uh(0, 0) > Uh(1, 0). Hence, each reaction function of the husband can only
arise if certain conditions on the husband’s utility rankings are satisfied. Once again,
each utility comparison correspond to a condition on random components εh (columns
2 and 3 of Table 5).
Since in Stackelberg–wife leader game, the roles of the spouses are asymmetric, each
reaction function of the husband calls a utility comparison for the wife. For each of the
reaction function of the husband, the utility comparison of the wife, Sj for j = 1, 2, 3, 4
is given in Table 6. For example, when she makes her decision, if wife knows that the
husband will always decide not to work whether she decides to work or not, the utility
11See Appendix B for details.
12See Appendix D for the description of SE in Stackelberg–husband leader game.
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Table 5: Husband’s reaction functions
Reaction function Utility comparison Condition
H1: yh = 0 if yw = 0 and Uh(0, 1) < Uh(0, 0) and εw < −x′hβh −max(0, αh)
yh = 0 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) < Uh(1, 0)
H2: yh = 0 if yw = 0 and Uh(0, 1) < Uh(0, 0) and −x′hβh − αh < εh < −x′hβh if αh > 0
yh = 1 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) > Uh(1, 0)
H3: yh = 1 if yw = 0 and Uh(0, 1) > Uh(0, 0) and −x′hβh < εh < −x′hβh − αh if αh < 0
yh = 0 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) < Uh(1, 0)
H4: yh = 1 if yw = 0 and Uh(0, 1) > Uh(0, 0) and −x′hβh −min(0, αh) < εh
yh = 1 if yw = 1 Uh(1, 1) > Uh(1, 0)
Table 6: Wife’s utility comparisons
Reaction function for the husband Utility comparison for the wife Condition
H1 S1: Uw(1, 0) > Uw(0, 0) εw > −x′wβw
H2 S2: Uw(1, 1) > Uw(0, 0) εw > −x′wβw − α1w
H3 S3: Uw(1, 0) > Uw(0, 1) εw > −x′wβw − α0w
H4 S4: Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0) εw > −x′wβw − αw
comparison for the wife is S1, i.e. the wife only works if Uw(1, 0) > Uw(0, 0) and does
not work if Uw(1, 0) < Uw(0, 0). Once again, the utility comparisons of the wife can
only arise if certain conditions are satisfied by εw. These conditions are provided in
the last column of Table 6.
Table 7: Stackelberg Equilibria
H1 and S1 (0,1) H3 and S3 (0,1)
H1 and S1 (0,0) H3 and S3 (1,0)
H2 and S2 (1,1) H4 and S4 (1,1)
H2 and S2 (0,0) H4 and S4 (1,0)
Given the husband’s reaction functions and the wife’s utility comparisons, the SE can
be defined. Table 7 presents the SE for each pair of husband’s reaction function and
wife’s utility comparisons. In Table 7, Sj denotes the negation of Sj for j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
For example for the pair of husband’s reaction function and wife’s utility comparison
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(H1, S1), the unique SE is (0,1), i.e. husband decides not to work and the wife decides
to work. As seen in Table 7, the SE is always unique. The outcome (0,1) is SE if
the pair of husband’s reaction functions and wife’s utility comparisons is (H1, S1) or
(H3, S3). Once again, the probability of each observed outcome can be written in
terms of the probabilities of pairs of the reaction function of husband and the utility
comparison of husband to arise, as a result in terms of model parameters.13
2.3 Nash/Pareto Optimality
It is well known that the game theoretical models may yield outcomes that are not
Pareto optimal. Bargaining models and collective models are based on the hypothesis
that the household decisions are Pareto optimal. Considering this possibility, we em-
ploy the approach suggested by Kooreman (1994) that imposes Pareto optimality on
the observed outcomes of the game played between two players.
For the model described in Equation 1, there is a large number of cases with multiple
solutions. For model predictability, Kooreman (1994) suggests to use Nash principle to
reduce the large number of cases with multiple solutions. In this approach, players are
assumed to play a Nash game and three cases are distinguished (i) there is a unique
NE, (ii) there are multiple Nash equilibria and (iii) there is no NE in pure strategies.
Kooreman (1994) shows the existence of Pareto optimal allocation in each of these
cases. In particular (i) if the game has a unique NE that is not Pareto optimal, there
exists exactly one allocation that both players are better off as compared to the NE (ii)
if the game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, at least one of them is Pareto
optimal, and (iii) if the game has no NE in pure strategies there will be at least two
Pareto optimal allocation. Therefore, we distinguish the three cases and apply the
following rule to determine the outcome of the game: (i) if the game has a unique
NE and if this is Pareto optimal, then that is the outcome of the game. If the unique
NE is not Pareto optimal, players are assumed to choose the Pareto efficient outcome,
(ii) if the game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies and if only one of the Nash
equilibria is Pareto optimal, this is assumed to be the outcome of the game. If both
NE of the Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal, the players are assumed to choose one
of the two Nash equilibria with equal probabilities, and (iii) if the game does not have
a NE in pure strategies, then players are assumed to choose one of the Pareto optimal
allocations with equal probabilities.
13See Appendix C for details.
17
To determine observed outcomes based on the Nash/Pareto optimality model, utility
rankings of husband and wife are required. Since there are four possible outcomes, the
number of possible utility rankings for a couple is 4!2. In order to reduce the number
of possible cases, it is necessary to impose restrictions on the model parameters. Since,
in the family labor supply framework, the restrictions on the parameters, α1h > 0,
α0h > 0, α
1
w > 0 and α
0
w > 0 imply that spouse’s employment has a positive effect on
individual’s utility, in our analysis we impose α1h, α
0
h, α
1
w and αw to be positive.
Once again, using the model parametrization in Equation 1, the utility rankings of the
husband and the wife can be written in terms of conditions on the random components
εh and εw. This allows us to write the expressions for each possible outcome of the
joint family labor supply, in terms of model parameters.14
3 Identification and Estimation
We estimate the game theoretical models described in the previous section using a max-
imum likelihood estimation strategy by assuming that (εh, εw) follow a bivariate normal
distribution with zero means, unit variances and correlation ρ. The log-likelihood func-
tion for each game-theoretical model is as follows:
L =
∑
c
log Prc(yh, yw)
=
∑
c
[yhyw log Prc(1, 1) + yh(1− yw) log Prc(1, 0)
+ (1− yh)yw log Prc(0, 1) + (1− yh)(1− yw) log Prc(0, 0)], (4)
where c indexes the observations, i.e. couples. To estimate a particular model, the
expressions for four outcome probabilities (Pr(1, 1),Pr(1, 0),Pr(0, 1) and Pr(0, 0)) are
replaced with their corresponding terms based on model parameters.15
In addition to game–theoretical models, we also consider a model without interactions
between spouses’ decisions. In particular, we estimate simultaneous probit model de-
scribed in Equation 3 by imposing the coherency condition on model parameters. In
particular we impose the condition that spouses’ decisions do not affect each other’s
decision, i.e. αh = αw = 0 and estimate a bivariate probit model.
14See Appendix E for details.
15See Appendices B, C, D and E for the expressions for each possible outcome probability in Nash
model, Stackelberg–wife leader model, Stackelberg–husband leader model and Nash/Pareto optimality,
respectively.
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Table 8: Identified parameters in models
Model Identified Parameters
Bivariate probit αh and αw = 0, βh, βw
Nash αh, αw, βh, βw
Stackelberg–husband leader α1h and α
0
h, αw, βh, βw
Stackelberg–wife leader αh, α
1
w and α
0
w, βh, βw
Nash/Pareto optimality α1h and α
0
h, α
1
w and α
0
w, βh, βw
Since the expressions for probability of observing each outcome is different in each
game theoretical model, all the parameters are not identified in all the models. The
identifiable parameters in each model are summarized in Table 8. In all the models, βh
and βw are identified, but β
1
h, β
0
h, β
1
w and β
0
w are not identified separately. Furthermore,
the impact of wife’s employment decision on husband’s utility of not working, α1h and on
husband’s utility of working, α0h are separately identified only in Stackelberg–husband
leader model and Nash/Pareto optimality. In the remaining models, only αh, that
is α1h − α0h is identified. On the other hand, the impact of husband’s employment
decision on wife’s market and reservation wage (α1w and α
0
w) are separately identified
only in Stackelberg–wife leader model and Nash/Pareto optimality. In other game
theoretical models, only the impact of husband’s employment decision on the wife’s
utility difference between working and not working, αw = α
1
w − α0w is identified. By
construction, in bivariate probit model, the impact of spouse’s employment decision
on the individual’s utility is zero, i.e. αh = 0 and αw = 0.
In our analysis, we allow for the behavioral parameters of the models to differ among
four type of couples. Therefore, for four type of couples (homogamy–low, heterogamy–
husband high, heterogamy–wife high and homogamy-high), we estimate the bivariate
probit model and game–theoretical models separately. Then, given the observed em-
ployment decision of couples, we determine the way that couples decide their labor
supply. In particular, for each couple in the sample, we calculate the predicted prob-
abilities of four possible outcomes –both work, only husband works, only wife works
or both do not work– from each model. Next, we determine the model that gives the
highest probability for the observed joint employment decision of the couple and as-
sign to the couple this particular model. As a result, for each type (homogamy–low,
heterogamy–husband high, heterogamy–wife high and homogamy–high), we estimate
the fraction of households that make their decisions with a particular rule.
Once we assign a particular decision making process for each household, we predict
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the marginal probabilities of working for husband and wife from the assigned model.
This allows us, in the next step to calculate the labor supply elasticities. To calculate
the labor supply elasticities we increment own wage of the individual, or spouse’s wage
or non–labor family income of each couple by one percent. Then using the model
parameters, we recalculate the marginal probabilities of working for husband and wife
after the increase. Comparing the marginal probability of working for each individual
before and after the incrementation gives us a participation elasticity of the husband
and the wife of each couple. Finally, using the labor supply elasticities of couples, we
calculate the average labor supply elasticity of married men and women.
4 Data and Empirical Specification
We use the 2000 Census data for the U.S. obtained from IPUMS-USA. The sample is
restricted to married individuals ages 25-54 with a 25-54 year old spouse present, not
living in group quarters, not in school and not self–employed. We also exclude from
the sample, individuals with allocated annual weeks worked or allocated hours worked
per year.16 Since, the proportion of nonparticipating males is very small, we focus
on working husbands and model the choice between working full-time and working
part-time.17 Therefore, in our analysis the observed outcomes, yh and yw are defined
as
yh =
{
1 if husband works at least 35 hrs/wk
0 if husband works less than 35 hrs/wk
and yw =
{
1 if wife works
0 if wife does not work.
One of the key variables in our analysis is educational attainment of husbands and
wives. We consider the education level as high if the individual has at least a college
degree and as low otherwise. Couples with similar education level (low–low or high–
high) are considered as homogamy, while couples with different education levels (high–
low or low–high) considered as heterogamy.
In the next step, we specify the set of explanatory variables of the market and reserva-
tion wage equations for husbands and wives. The market wage equations of husbands
16IPUMS determines the missing, illegible and inconsistent observations and allocates values to
these observations using different procedures. IPUMS provides Data Quality Flag variables for these
variables to determine allocated observations. See https://usa.ipums.org/usa/flags.shtml for details.
17Although in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), for the U.S. there is no definition of full-time
or part-time employment,the 35 hours cut-off point is motivated by the fact that the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) defines those who work for less than 35 hours per week as part-time workers.
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and wives are
Uh(1, yw) = x
′
hβ
1
h + α
1
hyw + η
1
h
Uw(yh, 1) = x
′
wβ
1
w + α
1
wyh + η
1
w, (5)
where xh and xw consist of age, years of education, race dummies, and geographic
variables including a regional dummy and a dummy for residence being in a metropoli-
tan statistical area (MSA), and a constant term. The reservation wage equations for
husbands and wives are specified as
Uh(0, yw) = z
′
hβ
0
h + α
0
hyw + η
0
h
Uw(yh, 0) = z
′
wβ
0
w + α
0
wyh + η
0
w. (6)
The set of explanatory variables of the reservation wage equation for husbands, zh
includes a constant term, non labor family income (defined as the sum of interest, divi-
dends and rent income), logarithm of his hourly wage and logarithm of his wife’s hourly
wage. For wives, zw includes a constant term, non–labor family income, logarithm of
her hourly wage, logarithm of her husband’s wage, number of children and a dummy
for the presence of 0 to 6 years old children.
Since our interest is to calculate the labor supply elasticities, including individual’s and
the spouse’s wages to the reservation wage equations is crucial in our analysis. However,
we do not observe wages for non–workers. Thus, we use the following procedure to
impute wages. First, we define hourly wages as annual earnings divided by annual
hours worked for wage and salary workers. Second, we consider hourly wages as invalid
if they are allocated or if they are less than $2 or greater than $250 per hour in 1999
dollars. Third, we run a separate selectivity bias corrected wage regression for each
type of couples (homogamy-low, heterogamy-husband high, heterogamy-wife high and
homogamy-high) and for each spouse (husbands and wives) using the Heckman two-
step method (Heckman, 1979). In particular, at the first stage, a pair of reduced form
probit regressions are run separately for husband and for wife for each type of couples
of the form:
y∗h = z˜
′
hγh + ξh,
and
y∗w = z˜
′
wγw + ξw,
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where
yi =
{
1 if y∗i > 0
0 otherwise
for i = h,w, (7)
where z˜h and z˜w include the variables that affect the participation decisions of the
husbands and wives. We include in z˜h a constant, cubic terms in age and years of
education, race dummy, non-labor family income and geographic variables including
regional dummies and a dummy for the size of the MSA of residence. In addition, z˜h
and z˜w include the number of children and the presence of children younger than six.
At the second stage, we run selection corrected wage regressions for each gender and
for each type of couples of the form
lnWh = x˜
′
hδh + ωh,
and
lnWw = x˜
′
wδw + ωw, (8)
where x˜h and x˜w include the inverse Mills ratios calculated from the first stage, a
constant term, cubic terms in age and years of education, race and geographic variables
including regional dummies and a dummy for the size of the MSA of residence. The
exclusion of non-labor income and children variables for wives and non-labor income for
husbands at the first stage provides identification of the inverse Mills ratio term in the
second stage. The predicted values for wages obtained from selection corrected wage
equations specified in Equation 7 and imputed for all women and men to minimize the
effect of measurement error in wages.18
The sample statistics by type of couples are provided in Table 9. Of the 848,835
remaining couples after selection, 79% of them are homogamy (57.64% low type and
21.31% high type), whereas, only 11.90% of them are heterogamy–husband high and
9.14% of them are heterogamy–wife high types. As seen in Table 9, men are more likely
to be full–time employed independent of whom they marry with. On the other hand,
employment rate of married women in our sample is around 82% for high–educated and
only 75% for low–educated. Hence, a well–known fact, that is high–educated married
women are more likely be employed than low–educated ones, is also present in our
sample. What is lesser known is that, as seen in Table 9, high–educated women are
less likely to be employed if they are married to high–educated men. In our sample,
18The identification of wage coefficients in Equation 5 comes form the exclusion of higher order
terms in age and education in zh and zw.
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among low–educated women, employment rate is larger for women married to low–
educated men compared to women married to high–educated men.
Not surprisingly, wages increase by education level. However, average hourly wage
differs within the same education group depending on the educational similarity be-
tween spouses. Among individuals with the same level of education (low or high),
the logarithm of hourly wage is higher for those married to someone with high edu-
cation than those married to someone with low education. Non–labor family income
also increase by the level of educational attainment. High–educated couples have on
average the highest non–labor family income. Among heterogamous couples, average
non–labor family income is higher for wife being the low–educated and husband being
the high–educated one.
By construction, the years of education differs among different type of households.
However, among the same level of educational attainment, average years of schooling
is higher for the ones that are married to someone with high education. Furthermore,
the sample of wives are relatively younger than husbands. Husbands and wives of
heterogamous couples with the wife being the low–educated spouse, are slightly older
than other types of husbands and wives. More than 82% of the couples sample consists
of whites, non–whites being more likely to be homogamy–low type. The average num-
ber of children is similar among couples. Homogamy–low and heterogamy–husband
high type couples have slightly more kids compared to other couples. On the other
hand, homogamy–high and heterogamy–wife high type couples are slightly more likely
to have 0-6 years old children.
5 Estimation Results
In this section, we start presenting our estimation results. We first provide the key pa-
rameter estimates of bivariate probit model and game–theoretical models for homogamy–
low, heterogamy–husband high, heterogamy–wife high and homogamy–high type cou-
ples. Then, using the parameter estimates of each model, we determine the way that
couples decide their labor supply by assigning to each couple the model that gives
the highest probability of the observed joint employment decisions of the husband and
the wife. Hence, we know the fraction of couples that follows of a particular decision
making process. In what follows, we first look at how well the estimated model fits the
observed employment rates of husbands and wives. Given that the model provides a
satisfactory fit to the data, we then calculate the labor supply elasticities of married
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Table 9: Summary statistics by type of couples
Homogamy Heterogamy Heterogamy Homogamy
low husband-high wife-high high
Wife
Employed (%) 0.75 0.70 0.89 0.79
Log Hourly wage 2.37 2.48 2.89 2.93
(0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Age 38.67 40.45 38.32 38.85
(7.53) (7.40) (7.38) (7.61)
Years of education 11.84 12.76 16.46 16.70
(2.07) (1.09) (0.84) (0.95)
Race (% white) 0.79 0.86 0.84 0.85
Husband
Employed full-time (%) 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
Log hourly wage 2.73 3.24 2.81 3.26
(0.22) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18)
Age 40.48 42.54 39.91 40.46
(7.58) (7.33) (7.56) (7.71)
Years of education 11.81 16.53 12.68 16.86
(2.09) (0.88) (1.12) (0.99)
Race (% white) 0.79 0.86 0.84 0.86
Family non-labor income 901 3,076 2,053 5,344
(in 000 dollars per year) (7,298) (14,790) (12,332) (20,726)
Number of children 1.64 1.53 1.35 1.39
(1.25) (1.20) (1.11) (1.13)
% with 0-6 years old children 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.33
MSA (%) 0.78 0.88 0.84 0.91
Number of obs. 505,091 96,616 77,043 170,085
Data source: 5% sample of the 2000 Census IPUMS. Notes: Sample includes married individuals ages 25-54 with a 25-54
year old spouse present, not living in group quarters, not in school, not self-employed and do not have allocated weeks or
hours. For husbands, the fraction of employed full time is over the employed husbands. Non–labor family income consists
of interest, dividends and rent. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
women.
5.1 Key Parameter Estimates
Tables 10.a, 10.b, 10.c and 10.d provides the key parameter estimates for homogamy–
low, heterogamy–husband high, heterogamy–wife high and homogamy–high type cou-
ples, respectively.19 In all tables, each column represent the key parameter estimates
(αh
1, αh
0 α1
w
and α0
w
), the coefficient estimates of own log wage, spouse’s log wage and
non–labor income for husbands and wives (βh and βw) from a particular model.
19The full set of estimates are available upon request.
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We start with the estimates of βh and βw. As seen from each table, the coefficient
estimates of own log wage, spouse’s log wage and non–labor income for husbands
and wives differ across models only slightly. On the other hand, there are significant
differences across different types of couples. As expected, for all couples in all models,
labor supply of married women is positively and significantly related to their own log
wages (i.e. βw > 0), negatively and significantly related to husband’s log wages and
non–labor family income (i.e. βw < 0). For each model, the coefficient estimate of
log own wage rate is highest for low–educated wives married to low education men
and smallest for high–educated wives married to low educated men (Tables 10.a and
10.c). The coefficient estimates of own wage for low educated women married to high–
educated men and for high–educated women married to high–educated men are similar
and fall between these two extremes (Tables 10.b and 10.d). Moreover, the coefficient
estimates of log husband’s wage rate for married women are relatively small if they
are married to low educated men (Tables 10.a and 10.c) and larger if they are married
to high–educated men (Tables 10.b and 10.d). For all women, for each model, the
coefficient estimates of non–labor family income is significant, but rather small.
For husbands, on the other hand the coefficient estimates, βh, indicate that full–time
employment of married men is positively and significantly related to their own log
wages, negatively and significantly related to non–labor family income for all type
of couples. However, for a particular model, the coefficient estimates of log wife’s
wage differ among types. For homogamy–low and heterogamy–husband high type
couples, husband’s full–time employment is positively and significantly related to wife’s
hourly wage. On the contrary, in homogamy–low and heterogamy–husband high type
couples, husband’s full–time employment is negatively and significantly related to wife’s
hourly wage in heterogamy–wife high type couples, whereas in homogamy–high type
couples most of the models indicate no significant relation between husband’s full–time
employment and wife’s hourly wage.20
Now, we turn our attention to the estimates of cross–effects. Recall that, for i = h,w,
α1i and α
0
i denote the effect of spouse’s employment on individual’s market wage and
reservation wage, respectively. A priori, spouse’s employment is expected to increase
the reservation wage of the individual (α0h > 0 and α
0
w > 0) and no cross effects
(α1h = 0 and α
1
w = 0) are expected on the spouses’ market wages. This implies negative
estimates of the parameters αh = α
1
h − α0h and αw = α1w − α0w. As Tables 10.a to 10.d
present, the significant estimates of αh (estimated and implied by the estimates for α
1
h
20The only exception is bivariate model which predicts a negative and significant relation between
full–time employment and wife’s hourly wage.
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and α0h) are negative for all types.
21 In other words, participation of wife makes her
husband less inclined to work full–time for all type of couples. However, for wives, the
significant estimates of αw (estimated or implied by the estimates for α
1
w and α
0
w) are
positive for all types. This implies that full–time employment of husband makes his
wife more likely to work.
Next, we compare the estimates of the correlation parameter ρ. It is important to note
that, ρ is not simply the correlation between omitted variables in the husband’s and
wife’s equations. Instead, as seen in Assumption A.2, it arises from a more complicated
relationship between εh = ηh(1, yw) − ηh(0, yw) and εw = ηw(yh, 1) − ηw(yh, 0). Recall
that, εh and εw denote the difference between the random utility that the individual
derives from working and not working for any given employment decision of the spouse.
In families, where the division of housework is unbalanced, these terms might be nega-
tively correlated. For instance, consider a couple that husband always chooses to work
full–time given any decision of the wife. In this case, wife may take the housework re-
sponsibilities, and unless she receives a high–wage offer she may prefer not to work (i.e.
her reservation wage increases). In this case, ρ will be negative. On the other hand,
consider a couple that both spouses are career–oriented, and enjoy working more than
staying at home. In this case, ρ will be positive. Consistent with this expectation, the
significant estimates of ρ from game–theoretical models is negative for homogamy–low
type couples and heterogamous couples (Tables 10.a to 10.c), whereas it is positive for
homogamy–high type couples (Table 10.d).
Note that, the significant estimates of the parameter ρ from bivariate probit model
and game–theoretical models have opposite signs (Tables 10.a and 10.d). In bivariate
probit model, the cross-effects may be picked up by the correlation parameter ρ. In
fact, for homogamy-low type (Table 10.a), the significant estimates for cross effects are
positive (αh and αw) and in the bivariate probit model, that cross–effects are assumed
to be zero, the estimate of the correlation parameter ρ turns to be positive. However,
for homogamy–high type (Table 10.d) the sign of the correlation parameter estimate ρ
is negative in bivariate probit model, whereas it is positive in game–theoretical models.
Once again, for homogamy–high types, negative cross effects may be picked up by the
correlation parameter ρ in the bivariate probit model.
21The only exceptions are Stackelberg–wife leader model for homogamy–low and Nash/Pareto op-
timality for heterogamy–wife high types.
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Table 10.a: Key parameter estimates, Homogamy–low
Homogamy Bivariate Stackelberg Stackelberg Nash/
low Probit Nash Husband leader Wife leader Pareto optimality
βw
log(wage) 1.920*** 1.919*** 1.919*** 2.006*** 1.918***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027)
log(husband’s wage) -0.055*** -0.066*** -0.065*** 0.028 -0.067***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
non–labor income -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(in 000 dollars) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
βh
log(wage) 0.710*** 0.717*** 0.718*** 0.612*** 0.721***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.060)
log(wife’s wage) 0.148*** 0.207*** 0.195*** 0.157*** 0.197***
(0.028) (0.042) (0.041) (0.027) (0.042)
non–labor income -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(in 000 dollars) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
αw0 5.914 -0.290
αw 0.288** 0.243 (26.512) (0.179)
αw1 (0.140) (0.124) 6.112 0.035
(26.511) (0.095)
αh0 -0.027 -0.408
αh -0.101 (0.132) 0.816*** (0.843)
αh1 (0.053) -0.119 (0.038) -0.507
(0.133) (0.836)
ρ 0.025*** -0.039 -0.043 -0.106** -0.068
(0.005) (0.051) (0.055) (0.045) (0.062)
Log-likelihood -324200.69 -324197.93 -324198.05 -324197.55 -324113.56
df 35 37 38 38 39
Number of obs. 505091 505091 505091 505091 505091
Data Source: 5% sample of the 2000 Census IPUMS.
Notes: (i) *, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance level respectively. (ii) See text for the
description of the model parameters.
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Table 10.b: Key parameter estimates, Heterogamy–husband high
Heterogamy Bivariate Stackelberg Stackelberg Nash/
husband high Probit Nash Husband leader Wife leader Pareto optimality
βw
log(wage) 0.607*** 0.583*** 0.590*** 0.572*** 0.611***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.118) (0.103)
log(husband’s wage) -0.833*** -0.820*** -0.824*** -0.842*** -0.852***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.058) (0.044)
non–labor income -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(in 000 dollars) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
βh
log(wage) 0.984*** 0.702*** 0.777*** 0.068 0.741**
(0.180) (0.205) (0.192) (0.180) (0.236)
log(wife’s wage) 0.239** 0.343** 0.348*** 0.448*** 0.473***
(0.087) (0.120) (0.096) (0.090) (0.114)
non–labor income -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(in 000 dollars) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
αw0 2.108*** 1.018***
αw 1.258 0.761** (0.179) (0.298)
αw1 (0.795) (0.237) 2.990*** 3.687***
(0.160) (0.415)
αh0 0.275* 1.179***
αh -0.371 (0.131) -0.781*** (0.124)
αh1 (0.340) 0.010 (0.049) 0.908***
(0.164) (0.146)
ρ -0.013 -0.330 -0.161 -0.226** -0.202
(0.012) (0.189) (0.101) (0.075) (0.114)
Log-likelihood -65068.33 -65058.11 -65060.60 -65016.05 -65049.35
df 35 37 38 38 39
Number of obs. 96616 96616 96616 96616 96616
Data Source: 5% sample of the 2000 Census IPUMS.
Notes: (i) *, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance level respectively. (ii) See text for the
description of the model parameters.
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Table 10.c: Key parameter estimates, Heterogamy–wife high
Heterogamy Bivariate Stackelberg Stackelberg Nash/
wife high Probit Nash Husband leader Wife leader Pareto optimality
βw
log(wage) 0.077 0.060 0.062 0.355 0.036
(0.159) (0.158) (0.158) (0.225) (0.177)
log(husband’s wage) -0.173** -0.227*** -0.186** -0.672*** -0.070
(0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.112) (0.074)
non–labor income -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.010***
(in 000 dollars) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
βh
log(wage) 1.134*** 0.991*** 0.952*** 0.826*** 1.005***
(0.213) (0.227) (0.222) (0.192) (0.207)
log(wife’s wage) -0.277** -0.233* -0.230* -0.254** -0.333***
(0.097) (0.103) (0.100) (0.093) (0.098)
non–labor income -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005***
(in 000 dollars) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
αw0 2.801*** 7.259
αw 2.101*** 1.060** (0.262) (94.967)
αw1 (0.336) (0.365) 3.753*** 7.219
(0.228) (94.976)
αh0 0.518** 0.462***
αh -0.957** (0.180) -0.397*** (0.092)
αh1 (0.360) 0.305 (0.029) 1.624***
(0.272) (0.132)
ρ -0.005 -0.555*** -0.192 -0.266** 0.153
(0.016) (0.114) (0.160) (0.102) (0.122)
Log-likelihood -34748.79 -34741.43 -34741.21 -34704.29 -34726.17
df 35 37 38 38 39
Number of obs. 77043 77043 77043 77043 77043
Data Source: 5% sample of the 2000 Census IPUMS.
Notes: (i) *, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance level respectively. (ii) See text for the
description of the model parameters.
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Table 10.d: Key parameter estimates, Homogamy–high
Homogamy Bivariate Stackelberg Stackelberg Nash/
high Probit Nash Husband leader Wife leader Pareto optimality
βw
log(wage) 0.872*** 0.851*** 0.865*** 0.862*** 0.861***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081)
log(husband’s wage) -1.057*** -1.054*** -1.053*** -1.055*** -1.056***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
non–labor income -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(in 000 dollars) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
βh
log(wage) 0.942*** 0.677*** 0.742*** 0.731*** 0.715***
(0.089) (0.103) (0.111) (0.112) (0.108)
log(wife’s wage) -0.172** -0.035 -0.059 -0.066 -0.059
(0.057) (0.063) (0.065) (0.067) (0.066)
non–labor income -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(in 000 dollars) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
αw0 -0.587* -2.089
αw 0.456 -0.007* (0.253) (1.977)
αw1 (0.307) (0.003) -0.196 -1.880
(0.388) (1.970)
αh0 4.792 0.330***
αh -0.380*** (10.009) -0.360*** (0.099)
αh1 (0.088) 4.416 (0.063) 0.025
(10.008) (0.036)
ρ -0.059*** -0.048 0.190*** 0.037 0.003
(0.010) (0.108) (0.051) (0.114) (0.148)
Log-likelihood -96931.92 -96918.14 -96917.21 -96917.04 -96916.89
df 35 37 38 38 39
Number of obs. 170085 170085 170085 170085 170085
Data Source: 5% sample of the 2000 Census IPUMS.
Notes: (i) *, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance level respectively. (ii) See text for the
description of the model parameters.
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5.2 Distribution of Couples
Given the parameter estimates, we select the model that best predicts the observed
joint labor supply behavior of each couple in the sample. To asses the model fit in terms
of the employment rate of wives and full–time employment rate of husbands, Table 11
presents the actual and predicted employment rate of wives and full–time employment
rate of different types. As shown in Table 11, the model predicts the employment rates
of wives and husbands in different type of couples very closely.
Table 11: Actual and predicted employment rates
Employment rate Full-time employment
of wives rate of husbands
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Homogamy-low 0.75 0.76 0.89 0.90
Heterogamy-husband high 0.70 0.71 0.79 0.79
Heterogamy-wife high 0.89 0.90 0.97 0.97
Homogamy-high 0.79 0.79 0.98 0.98
Since, for each couple in the sample, we assign the model that best predicts the observed
joint labor supply behavior, for each type of household, we know the fraction of couples
that follow of a particular decision making process. The resulting distribution of couples
is presented in Table 12. As seen in Table 12, for most of the highly educated husbands
and wives (homogamy–high), the observed labor supply decision of the couple is best
predicted by bivariate probit model. Recall that, in bivariate probit model, the cross
effects of employment decisions are assumed to be zero. This implies that, most of
the high–educated spouses (about 46%) make their labor supply decisions independent
than each other. For these couples around 27% of household decisions can be justified
as coming from a Nash game. The joint labor supply decision of remaining homogamy-
high type couples are determined either by a Stackelberg leader game or Nash/Pareto
optimality model.
On the other hand, for the majority of homogamy–low and heterogamy –both low and
high– types, the labor supply decisions of spouses exhibit strong interactions. For the
majority of homogamy–low and heterogamy types, the labor supply decisions of the
spouses are best predicted by the Stackelberg–wife leader model. Hence, when wife
decides whether to work or not to work, she knows the action that her husband will
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take, and in making her labor supply decision she must take the husband’s payoff
into account and optimize accordingly. For around 20% of homogamy-low and 25%
of heterogamy couples, the household decisions are predicted best by Nash/Pareto
optimality model. The remaining homogamy-low and heterogamy type couples make
their joint labor supply decision either independently, or following a non–cooperative
Nash game or a Stackelberg–husband leader game.
Table 12: Distribution of couples by type
Stackelberg Stackelberg Nash/
Bivariate Husband Wife Pareto
Probit Nash leader leader optimality
Homogamy-low 14.3% 14.9% 0.2% 50.7% 19.9%
Heterogamy-husband high 15.9% 4.0% 2.6% 52.5% 24.9%
Heterogamy-wife high 19.2% 3.2% 3.3% 48.3% 26.1%
Homogamy-high 45.5% 26.8% 16.1% 7.5% 4.0%
At first it may be surprising that for most of the homogamy–low and heterogamous
couples, the joint labor supply decision is best predicted by Stackelberg–wife leader
model. In the literature of the economics of the family, there are some examples mod-
eled as a Stackelberg game. Bolin (1997), and Beblo and Robledo (2002) both consider
Stackelberg (husband) leader game to model intra-family time allocation. They suggest
that the spouse with more bargaining power, gets to be the leader in the Stackelberg
game. On the other hand, Kooreman (1994) finds that Stackelberg wife leader model
gives the best description of household participation decisions in a sample of Dutch
households. Chao (2002) also shows that Stackelberg wife leader model outperforms in
predicting contraceptive choice of married couples compared to consensual approach
and non–cooperative Nash game.
Earlier literature on gender identity and division of work within a household suggests
that traditional gender roles may lead women to lower their labor force participation.
For instance, Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2013) focus on the behavioral prescription
that “a man should earn more than his wife” and show that traditional gender roles to
distort labor market outcomes of women. Their analysis suggest that, since departing
from the traditional gender roles increase the likelihood of divorce, married women
sometimes stay out of labor force so as to avoid a situation where they would become
the primary breadwinner. Similarly, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) study the relation
between traditional gender roles and economic outcomes and show that gender–identity
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would lead to lower labor force participation of women is deviating from the prescription
that “men work in the labor force and women work in home” is costly.
In our sample, more than 82% of the couples that are best described by the Stackelberg–
wife leader game, either husband works full–time and the wife works as well, i.e.
(yh, yw) = (1, 1). Following the traditional gender roles, suppose that it is common
knowledge that the husband would rather prefer to work full time and his partner
to stay home than her to work, i.e. Uh(1, 0) > Uh(1, 1), but would prefer working
full time and his spouse to work than working part–time and his wife to work, i.e.
Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1). Suppose further that the wife derives a lower utility from not
working than working, i.e. Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0) and Uw(0, 1) > Uw(0, 0). Then it is
logical for wife to decide to work and make known to her husband this fact. Given
his wife’s decision, then husband will end up working full–time. Hence, the outcome
will be (yh, yw) = (1, 1). This might be particularly the case for women married to low
educated husbands. In fact, the largest fraction of couples with an observed outcome
(yh, yw) = (1, 1) and follow a Stackelberg–wife leader game is among heterogamy–wife
high types. In particular, about 89% of heterogamy–wife high type couples that fol-
low a Stackelberg–wife leader game has an observed outcome (yh, yw) = (1, 1). For
heterogamy–wife high types, it is logical to think that the high–educated wife would
be more attached to the market than her low–educated husband and will be willing to
work.
5.3 Labor Supply Elasticities of Married Women
We now turn our attention to the labor supply estimates of married women. Table
13 presents the average own wage, cross wage and income elasticities of participation
for married women by type. The average labor supply elasticities of married women
varies to a great extent for different types.22 The average participation own wage
elasticity is largest (0.77) for low–educated women married to low educated men, and
smallest (0.03) for high–educated women married to low educated men. The own
wage elasticities for low educated women married to high–educated men and for high–
educated women married to high–educated men are similar and fall between these two
extremes (about 0.30). Furthermore, cross wage elasticities for married women are
relatively small (less than -0.05) if they are married to low educated men and larger
22For all types of couples, labor supply elasticities of married men are small and the differences
between the labor supply elasticities of different types are negligible. See Table F.1 of Appendix F for
labor supply elasticities of married men.
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(about -0.37) if they are married to high–educated men. For all types of couples,
participation elasticity of non–labor family income for married women is small.
Table 13: Labor supply elasticities of married women by type of couples
Own Husband’s Non-labor
wage wage income
Homogamy-low 0.77 -0.02 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Heterogamy-husband high 0.30 -0.37 -0.012
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Heterogamy-wife high 0.03 -0.05 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Homogamy-high 0.31 -0.38 -0.016
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
What about the distribution of labor supply elasticities? Since our labor supply elas-
ticity calculations are based on the predictions of marginal probability of working for
each woman before and after an incrementation of her own wage, or her husband’s
wage, or non–labor family income, we know the distributions of labor supply elastic-
ities. As for all types of couples, the participation non–labor family income elasticity
of married women is small, we focus on the distributions of own wage elasticities and
cross wage elasticities. The distribution of own wage elasticities of married women is
presented in Figure 1. First, for all types of couples, the distribution of labor supply
own wage elasticity of married women is skewed right with no women having a nega-
tive elasticity. However, for all types, there exists women with labor supply own wage
elasticity that is close to zero, implying that for these women, own wage increases have
relatively small effects on their labor supply. Second, the dispersion of labor supply
own wage elasticity distribution differ considerably across different types. In particu-
lar, the distribution is more dispersed for homogamy–low types. The long upper tail
of the elasticity distribution for homogamy–low type couples implies that among these
families there are women with large labor supply own wage elasticity (with a maxi-
mum about 3.36). On the other hand, the dispersion is smallest for heterogamy–wife
high types. In other words, for these types, the labor supply own wage elasticities of
married women are concentrated around the mean which is close to zero (about 0.03).
Hence, for heterogamy–wife high types, the labor supply of all women show little re-
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sponsiveness to the changes in their own wages. The dispersions of the labor supply
own wage elasticity distributions for heterogamy–husband high and homogamy–high
types lie between these two extremes.
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Figure 1: Kernel density of participation own wage elasticities of married women by
type of couples
The distribution of cross wage elasticities of married women is presented in Figure 2.
In this case, since the cross wage elasticity is negative, the responsiveness of women
to the changes in their husbands’ wages increases as you move to the left of the elas-
ticity distribution. Note that, for all types of couples, the distributions of cross wage
elasticities are skewed left. For all types, there are women with own wage elasticity
that is close to zero, implying that for these women increases in their husbands’ wages
have relatively small effects on labor supply. For the majority of women in all types,
the cross wage elasticities are negative. The only exception is heterogamy–wife high
types. Among the heterogamy–wife high type couples, there are wives with positive
cross wage labor supply elasticity (with a maximum about 0.19). As seen in Figure
2, the dispersion of labor supply cross wage elasticity differs between different types.
Different than the labor supply own wage elasticity distribution, the labor supply cross
wage elasticity distribution is less dispersed for homogamy–low types. For these cou-
ples, the cross wage elasticities of married women are concentrated around the mean
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which is close to zero (about -0.02). Similar to the dispersion of own wage elasticity
distribution, the dispersion of cross wage elasticity distribution for heterogamy–wife
high types is small. Therefore, for homogamy–low and heterogamy–wife high types,
the labor supply of all women show little responsiveness to the changes in their hus-
bands’ wages. On the other hand, the dispersions of cross wage elasticity distributions
for heterogamy–husband high and homogamy–high types are similar and larger than
the other types.
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Figure 2: Kernel density of participation cross wage elasticities of married women by
type of couples
What accounts for the differences between women of different types? As Heim (2007)
notes, a high participation elasticity implies that the market wages must be close to
the reservation wage. Therefore, a small increase in wages or a decrease in spouse’s
wage or income will lead women to participate. This might be the case particularly
for low–educated women, since their employment and career opportunities are lower
compared to high educated women (Cohen and Bianchi, 1998). On the other hand,
if the employment and career opportunities vary among women of a particular type,
then for this type, the distribution of labor supply elasticities of married women will be
more dispersed. In fact, for homogamy–low types, unconditional distribution of the log
own wage for married women exhibits the largest variation consistent with the large
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Table 14: Characteristics of couples with labor supply own wage elasticities below and
above the average elasticity
Homogamy Heterogamy Heterogamy Homogamy
low husband-high wife-high high
Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above
Wife
Employed (%) 0.84 0.64 0.79 0.57 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.67
Log Hourly wage 2.44 2.29 2.58 2.57 2.83 2.83 2.95 2.93
(0.15) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14)
Age 39.36 37.68 41.89 38.36 38.88 37.37 39.40 38.17
(7.09) (8.01) (7.47) (6.76) (7.79) (6.53) (8.59) (6.11)
Years of education 12.59 10.76 12.93 12.51 16.57 16.27 16.96 16.37
(0.80) (2.74) (0.83) (1.34) (0.90) (0.69) (1.00) (0.78)
Race (% white) 0.83 0.74 0.88 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.81
Husband
Employed full-time (%) 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.98
Log Hourly wage 2.76 2.67 3.19 3.21 2.85 2.88 3.25 3.33
(0.18) (0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16)
Age 41.17 39.48 43.61 40.99 40.55 38.83 40.75 40.11
(7.28) (7.88) (7.46) (6.84) (7.91) (6.79) (8.71) (6.23)
Years of education 12.23 11.20 16.44 16.67 12.62 12.76 16.82 16.91
(1.32) (2.74) (0.83) (0.94) (1.14) (1.03) (0.98) (1.00)
Race (% white) 0.83 0.74 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.83
Family non-labor income 668 1,237 1,534 5,309 1,466 3,042 2,842 8,426
(in 000 dollars per year) (4,398) (10,095) (4,524) (22,299) (8,464) (16,912) (8,937) (29,033)
Number of children 1.22 2.24 0.96 2.36 0.90 2.09 0.73 2.20
(1.04) (1.28) (0.92) (1.07) (0.96) (0.92) (0.82) (0.90)
% with 0-6 years old children 0.08 0.49 0.04 0.55 0.12 0.63 0.11 0.60
MSA (%) 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.93 0.81 0.89 0.87 0.96
Number of obs. 300,239 204,852 57,466 39,150 48,712 28,331 94,580 75,505
Data source: 5% sample of the 2000 Census IPUMS. Notes: Sample includes married individuals ages 25-54 with a 25-54
year old spouse present, not living in group quarters, not in school, not self-employed and do not have allocated weeks or
hours. For husbands, the fraction of employed full time is over the employed husbands. Non–labor family income consists
of interest, dividends and rent. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
dispersion of their labor supply own wage elasticity distribution (See Table 9).
In Tables 14 and 15, we present the characteristics of different type of couples by
the labor supply responsiveness of wives to the own wage changes and the changes in
husband’s wage, respectively. For each type, the first column (below) shows the charac-
teristics of couples with wives whose labor supply elasticities are below or equal to the
average labor supply elasticity. On the other hand, the second column (above) presents
the characteristics of families with wives whose labor supply own wage elasticities are
above the average. Note that, since own wage elasticity of married women is positive
and cross wage elasticity is negative, in Table 14 the labor supply responsiveness of
married women to the changes in their own wages is higher if their labor supply elas-
ticities are above the average, whereas in Table 15 the labor supply responsiveness of
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Table 15: Characteristics of couples with labor supply cross wage elasticities below and
above the average elasticity
Homogamy Heterogamy Heterogamy Homogamy
low husband-high wife-high high
Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above
Wife
Employed (%) 0.68 0.80 0.55 0.81 0.83 0.93 0.67 0.89
Log Hourly wage 2.29 2.44 2.57 2.58 2.83 2.83 2.93 2.95
(0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18)
Age 37.58 39.34 38.47 41.81 37.27 38.93 38.16 39.41
(7.85) (7.25) (6.80) (7.48) (6.37) (7.86) (6.12) (8.59)
Years of education 10.65 12.56 12.53 12.92 16.24 16.59 16.37 16.96
(2.82) (0.82) (1.35) (0.84) (0.65) (0.91) (0.78) (1.00)
Race (% white) 0.73 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.87
Husband
Employed full-time (%) 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97
Log Hourly wage 2.67 2.76 3.22 3.19 2.88 2.85 3.33 3.26
(0.23) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.22)
Age 39.29 41.20 41.06 43.55 39.19 40.33 40.10 40.76
(7.74) (7.39) (6.83) (7.48) (6.89) (7.89) (6.24) (8.71)
Years of education 11.10 12.24 16.71 16.41 12.71 12.66 16.91 16.82
(2.82) (1.31) (0.96) (0.81) (1.14) (1.09) (1.00) (0.98)
Race (% white) 0.73 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.82 0.83 0.87
Family non-labor income 1,276 673 5,256 1,579 2,940 1,531 8,395 2,855
(in 000 dollars per year) (10,368) (4,484) (22,177) (5,065) (16,610) (8,858) (28,980) (9,005)
Number of children 2.29 1.24 2.34 0.98 2.12 0.89 2.20 0.72
(1.28) (1.05) (1.08) (0.94) (0.96) (0.92) (0.90) (0.82)
% with 0-6 years old children 0.49 0.10 0.54 0.04 0.65 0.10 0.60 0.11
MSA (%) 0.82 0.76 0.93 0.84 0.90 0.80 0.96 0.87
Number of obs. 188,959 316,132 38,925 57,691 28,058 48,985 75,687 94,398
Data source: 5% sample of the 2000 Census IPUMS. Notes: Sample includes married individuals ages 25-54 with a 25-54
year old spouse present, not living in group quarters, not in school, not self-employed and do not have allocated weeks or
hours. For husbands, the fraction of employed full time is over the employed husbands. Non–labor family income consists
of interest, dividends and rent. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
married women to the changes in their husbands’ wages is higher if their elasticities
are below or equal to the average. Tables 14 and 15 show that, for all types, married
women whose labor supply is more responsive (to their own or their husband’s wage)
are less likely to be employed, less educated, younger and less likely to be white. Their
husbands are also more likely to be less educated and young, and less likely to be white.
For homogamy–low types, if the labor supply of married women is more responsive,
their husbands earn on average less and they are less educated. However, for other
type of couples, the average hourly log wage of husbands is higher and the husbands
are more educated for women whose labor supply elasticities are more responsive to
the changes in their own wage and their husbands’ wages. Finally, for all types, the
labor supply of married women is more responsive to the changes in their own wages
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among families that have higher non–labor family income and more children and that
are more likely to have a pre–school age child and live in a MSA.
5.3.1 The role of children
One of the striking difference between women whose labor supply elasticity is below
or equal to the average elasticity and women with labor supply elasticities above the
average is the difference in their likelihood of having children. Since, the labor supply
elasticity of different types varies to a great extent, one can think the presence of pre–
school children as the source of heterogeneity among different types of couples. In fact,
Lundberg (1988) tests alternative theories of family labor supply behavior and finds
that the presence of young children has a crucial effect on household interactions.
Table 16: Distribution of couples by presence of 0–6 years old children
Stackelberg Stackelberg Nash/
Bivariate Husband Wife Pareto
Probit Nash leader leader optimality
with 0–6 years old children
Homogamy-low 7.0% 35.5% 0.0% 42.6% 14.9%
Heterogamy-husband high 2.2% 9.7% 5.3% 53.7% 29.0%
Heterogamy-wife high 3.4% 3.4% 8.5% 59.2% 25.6%
Homogamy-high 7.7% 51.7% 21.6% 12.2% 6.8%
without 0–6 years old child
Homogamy-low 16.6% 8.2% 0.3% 53.5% 21.5%
Heterogamy-husband high 20.4% 2.2% 1.7% 52.1% 23.6%
Heterogamy-wife high 26.1% 3.1% 1.1% 43.5% 26.3%
Homogamy-high 64.0% 14.6% 13.5% 5.3% 2.7%
Although we control for the number of children and the presence of pre–school children
in the reservation wage equation of wives, it is possible that household interactions
might be different for couples with and without pre–school children. One possibility
is that all couples with children make their decisions in a particular way, while all
couples without children make theirs in a different way. However, since we allow for
each couple to differ in the way they make their labor supply decisions, this should not
alter our results. But if there are large differences between the labor supply elasticities
of couples with and without pre–school children for some types but not for others,
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then differential responses of married women based on the spouses’ education levels
might depend on presence of children in the household. Considering this possibility,
we compare the distribution of couples and the labor supply elasticities of married
women of different types by the presence of 0–6 years old children. Tables 16 and 17
present these results.
Not surprisingly, the fraction of couples whose employment decisions follow the bivari-
ate probit model is smaller for the ones with pre–school children. Thus, consistent with
the findings of Lundberg (1988), labor supply decisions of spouses are more likely to be
independent of each other if there are no children of pre–school age in the household.
The presence of children matter most for homogamy–high couples. While without
children, we do not observe any interactions for majority of households (64%), with
children their employment decisions follow a non–cooperative Nash game (about 51%).
Table 17: Labor supply elasticities of married women by the presence of 0-6 years old
children
Own Husband’s Non-labor
wage wage income
with 0-6 years old children
Homogamy-low 1.07 -0.04 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Heterogamy-husband high 0.44 -0.57 -0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Heterogamy-wife high 0.05 -0.10 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Homogamy-high 0.45 -0.56 -0.020
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
without 0-6 years old child
Homogamy-low 0.68 -0.02 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Heterogamy-husband high 0.25 -0.31 -0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Heterogamy-wife high 0.02 -0.03 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Homogamy-high 0.24 -0.29 -0.015
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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How do these results affect the labor supply elasticities of married women? Table 17
presents the labor supply elasticities of married women of different types by the presence
of pre–school children. As expected, the elasticity estimates are larger for mothers of
young children. For all type of households. The participation wage elasticity is once
again highest for low–educated women married to a low–educated man and smallest
for high–educated women married to someone with low–education both for mothers
of pre–school children and other women. Their cross wage and income elasticities
suggest little responsiveness of labor supply of those women to changes in husband’s
wage or changes in non–labor income. Independent of having a 0–6 years old children,
once again, participation wage, cross wage and income elasticities of high–educated
women is as large as low–educated women if they are married to a high–educated man.
Hence, we conclude that, differential responses of married women based on the spouses’
education levels are present among married women, independent of whether children
are present in the household or not.
5.3.2 Aggregate Labor Supply Elasticities of Married Women
Given the average labor supply elasticities and the population shares of different types,
one can calculate the aggregate participation elasticity of married women. Formally,
the aggregate participation elasticity is calculated as∑
k
Pkk =  (9)
where Pk is the proportion of women that are of type k and k is the estimated (own
wage, or cross wage, or income) elasticity of married women of type k. It is important
to note that, this formulation of the overall participation elasticity captures the het-
erogeneity among couples in the way they make their labor supply decisions, and as a
result, differences in their labor supply responsiveness. Allowing for the heterogeneity
across couples yields an average wage elasticity of 0.56, an average cross wage elasticity
of -0.13, and an average income elasticity of -0.006.
How large are these elasticities? Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) provide recent
estimates of labor supply elasticities for married women in the U.S. Heim (2007) reports
a participation wage elasticity of 0.03 and a participation income elasticity of -0.05 in
2003. On the other hand, different models estimated by Blau and Kahn (2007) yield
participation wage elasticities between 0.27 and 0.30, cross wage elasticities between -
0.13 and -0.10, and income elasticities between -0.002 and -0.004 in 2000. Our elasticity
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estimates are larger than these estimates.
One of the main difference between our study and these studies is that we allow for
household interactions and we let these interactions differ across different types of
households. To understand the role of each of these factors, we conduct several exer-
cises. First, we ignore the heterogeneity across homogamous and heterogamous cou-
ples with different education levels and re–estimate the different models, i.e. bivariate
probit, Nash, Stackelberg–husband leader, Stackelberg–wife leader and Nash/Pareto
optimality, for all couples jointly. As a result, we have one set of behavioral parameter
estimates from each model for all couples. Then, using these parameter estimates we
consider two alternative scenarios.
In Scenario I, we ignore the differences between types but allowed for heterogeneity
across couples in the way they make their labor supply decisions. In particular, given
the observed employment decision of couples we calculate the predicted probabilities
of four possible outcomes –both work, only husband works, only wife works or both
do not work– from each model. This allows us to determine the model that gives the
highest probability to the observed joint employment decision of the couple. Then, we
assign to the couple this particular model and calculate the labor supply elasticities of
married women.
Table 18: Labor supply elasticities of married women, alternative scenarios
Own Husband’s Non-labor
wage wage income
Benchmark 0.56 -0.13 -0.006
Scenario I 0.25 -0.24 -0.006
Scenario II-Majority 0.29 -0.26 -0.006
Scenario II-Best-fit 0.20 -0.23 -0.007
Scenario II-No interaction 0.27 -0.23 -0.007
In Scenario II, we assign to all couples only one model as their decision making mech-
anism. Since the preferences of husbands and wives are not directly observed, we
consider three alternatives. The first one is to assign to all couples the model that
best predicts the observed outcome of the majority. Since 43% of the couples’ ob-
served decisions are best predicted by Stackelberg–wife leader model, this is the first
possibility we consider (Scenario II–majority). The second alternative is comparing
models based on their goodness of fit. Using Akaike and Bayesian information criteria
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as well as the Likelihood Dominance Criterion suggested by Pollak and Wales (1991)
to compare the performance of non-nested models, Nash/Pareto optimality is the pre-
ferred model (Scenario II–best–fit). Finally, we also ignore the household interactions
and estimate the labor supply elasticities of married women using the bivariate probit
model parameter estimates for all couples (Scenario II-no interaction). The elastic-
ity estimates based on different scenarios are presented in Table 18. For comparison,
benchmark elasticities are shown in the last row. In all the scenarios, we find that
the labor supply income elasticities for married women are small and similar to our
benchmark estimates. Hence, ignoring the differences between types has no significant
effect on labor supply income elasticities. However, in all scenarios, we find lower labor
supply own wage elasticities and higher labor supply cross wage elasticities for married
women. This is even true, when we ignore the heterogeneity among households but
allow for household interactions (Scenario I). It worths noting that the labor supply
own wage elasticities are similar to the ones estimated by Blau and Kahn (2007) when
heterogeneity among households is ignored (in all Scenarios). Blau and Kahn (2007)
without considering the household interactions and heterogeneity among couples find
participation wage elasticities between 0.27 and 0.30 in 2000.
6 The Shrinking Labor Supply Elasticities of Mar-
ried Women
Our results show that labor supply elasticities differ greatly among households. This
raises a natural question: What is the impact of compositional changes in population on
women’s overall labor supply elasticities? From 1980 to 2000, the population share of
couples changed considerably. Both women and men in 2000 were more educated than
their counterparts in 1980. Moreover, there had been an increase in the educational
resemblance of spouses in the United States (Mare, 1991; Pencavel, 1998; Schwartz
and Mare, 2005).
In order to get an idea of the effect of compositional changes on the married women’s
labor supply responsiveness we carry out the following counterfactual exercise. We
calculate what the overall labor supply elasticities would be, if the married women
had the responsiveness of 2000 but the distribution of couples would be of 1980. For
this purpose, we calculate the overall labor supply elasticities of married women from
Equation 10, using the elasticity estimates for year 2000 and the population shares of
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couples in 1980.23 The population shares of different type of couples in 1980 and in
2000 are presented in the first panel of Table 19. As noted by earlier studies, from 1980
to 2000, there had been an increase in the fraction of homogamy–high type couples.
In addition, there had been an increase in the share of heterogamy–wife high types
reflecting the increase in educational attainment levels of women during the recent
decades.
Table 19: Labor supply elasticities under counterfactual distribution of couples
Population share 1980 2000
Homogamy-low 0.72 0.60
Heterogamy-husband high 0.12 0.11
Heterogamy-Wife high 0.04 0.09
Homogamy-high 0.12 0.20
Participation elasticity Benchmark Counterfactual
Own wage 0.56 0.63
Husband’s wage -0.13 -0.11
Non-labor income -0.006 -0.004
The second panel of Table 19 presents the labor supply elasticities under the counter-
factual distribution of couples. For comparison, benchmark elasticities based on the
actual shares of couples in 2000 are shown in the last row of Table 19. Under the coun-
terfactual distribution of couples, we find a participation own wage elasticity of 0.63,
a participation cross wage elasticity of -0.11 and a participation non–labor income of
-0.004. This implies that, although, compositional changes do not have a considerable
effect on the participation cross wage and participation non–labor income elasticities
of married women, changing composition of couples accounts for a decline in participa-
tion own wage elasticity of married women –from 0.63 to 0.56– between 1980 and 2000.
This result suggests that the increase in their educational attainment levels during the
recent decades results in a smaller responsiveness for married women to the changes
in their wages. Nonetheless, for quantifying the role of compositional changes on the
labor supply responsiveness of married women needs a more detailed analysis.
23Data for the population shares of couples in 1980 comes from 5% sample of the 1980 Census
IPUMS–USA.
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7 Concluding Remarks
We provide labor supply elasticity estimates of married men and women allowing for
heterogeneity among couples (by educational attainments of husbands and wives) and
modeling explicitly how household members interact and make their labor supply de-
cisions. To this end, we focus on the static labor supply decision of couples along the
extensive margin.
We find that the labor supply decisions of husbands and wives depend on each other,
unless both spouses are highly educated. For high-educated couples, the labor sup-
ply decisions of husband and wife are jointly determined only if they have pre-school
children. We also find that labor supply elasticities differ greatly among households.
The participation own wage elasticity is largest for low-educated women married to low
educated men, and smallest for high-educated women married to low educated men.
The own wage elasticities for low educated women married to high-educated men and
for higheducated women married to high-educated men are similar and fall between
these two extremes. For all types of couples, participation elasticity of nonlabor family
income is small. The cross-wage elasticities for married women are relatively small if
they are married to low educated men and larger if they are married to higheducated
men. Allowing for heterogeneity across couples yields an overall participation wage
elasticity of 0.56, a cross wage elasticity of -0.13 and an income elasticity of -0.006 for
married women. Our analysis show that just allowing for household interactions while
ignoring heterogeneity among households generates lower labor supply wage elasticity
(about 0.25) for married women.
The results of this study has important implications for policy analysis. Since, many
public policies, e.g. earned income tax credit (EITC) or Temporary Assistance for
Family Needs (TAFN) programs, are designed to target specific groups, it is essential
to understand the potential impacts on labor supply of different individuals. Earlier
studies mostly focus on the heterogeneity associated to the presence of preschool chil-
dren (e.g. Lundberg, 1988). In this study, we further show that differential responses
of married women based on the spouses’ education levels are present among married
women, independent of whether children are present in the household or not.
The analysis in this paper also provides a natural framework to study how changes
in educational attainments and household structure affect aggregate labor supply elas-
ticities. Over the last decades, there has been dramatic changes in the educational
composition of population in the U.S. Not only the educational attainment levels of
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men and women increased, but also the resemblance of husbands and wives on edu-
cational attainment increased substantially (Pencavel 1998; Schwartz and Mare 2005).
Our analysis indicate show that if the married women had the responsiveness of 2000
but the distribution of couples would have been as of 1980s, the aggregate labor supply
own wage elasticity of married women would be 0.63 instead of 0.56.
We conclude by commenting on three important issues we have abstracted from and
that might be important in future research. First, we have abstracted from fertility
decisions, which can be viewed as a shortcoming of our analysis. Although we control
for the presence of children in our analysis, earlier work suggest that the decision to
have children and the labor supply decision may be interdependent (e.g. Rosenzweig
and Wolpin 1980; Angrist and Evans 1998). The second issue pertains to the role of
increasing assortative mating and changing composition of families and its interplay
with labor supply elasticities. Our analysis in Section 6 is a preliminary first step
in this direction. Finally, we have not addressed the life–cycle and dynamic issues.
The dynamic extension of the family labor supply model would allow to analyze the
variations in family labor supply behavior of different type of couples over the life cycle.
We leave this extension for future research.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Simultaneous Probit Model
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Figure A.1: This figure depicts the possible outcomes when the conditions on the ran-
dom components in the simultaneous binary model are satisfied. Each panel illustrates
a different case for the signs of the parameters αh and αw. The region R in each panel
corresponds to the region where model is incoherent or incomplete. In the top left
panel this region is the intersection of (yh, yw) = (0, 0) and (yh, yw) = (1, 1), and in the
top right panel this is the intersection of (yh, yw) = (1, 0) and (yh, yw) = (0, 1). In the
bottom panels, regions R indicate no solution for (yh, yw)
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Appendix B. Nash Model
Outcome Probabilities in terms of Reaction Functions
Pr(0, 0) = Pr(H1,W1) + Pr(H1,W2) + Pr(H2,W1)
+ a1 Pr(H2,W2) + c1 Pr(H2,W3) + d1 Pr(H3,W2)
Pr(1, 0) = Pr(H3,W1) + Pr(H4,W1) + Pr(H4,W3)
+ b1 Pr(H3,W3) + c2 Pr(H2,W3) + d2 Pr(H3,W2)
Pr(0, 1) = Pr(H2,W4) + Pr(H4,W2) + Pr(H4,W4)
+ a2 Pr(H2,W2) + c4 Pr(H2,W3) + d4 Pr(H3,W2)
Pr(1, 1) = Pr(H1,W3) + Pr(H1,W4) + Pr(H3,W4)
+ b2 Pr(H3,W3) + c3 Pr(H2,W3) + d3 Pr(H3,W2)
Outcome Probabilities in terms of Model Parameters
If αh ≥ 0 and αw ≥ 0, then
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)− a1I(−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh − αh, x
′
wβw,−ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh + αh, x
′
wβw + αw, ρ)− a1I(−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
If αh ≥ 0 and αw < 0, then
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ) + c1I(−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−ρ) + c2I(−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh − αh, x
′
wβw,−ρ) + c3I(−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh + αh, x
′
wβw + αw, ρ) + c4I(−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
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If αh < 0 and αw ≥ 0, then
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ) + d1I(−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−ρ) + d2I(−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh − αh, x
′
wβw,−ρ) + d3I(−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh + αh, x
′
wβw + αw, ρ) + d4I(−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
If αh < 0 and αw < 0, then
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−ρ)− b2I(−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh − αh, x
′
wβw,−ρ)− b1I(−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh + αh, x
′
wβw + αw, ρ)
where Φ(a, b, ρ) is the cumulative distribution function evaluated at (a, b) of a bivariate
standard normal distribution with correlation ρ, I(a, b, c, d, ρ) is the integral of the
corresponding density over the range a ≥ εh, b ≥ εw and
a1 + a2 = 1 c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 = 1
b1 + b2 = 1 d1 + d2 + d3 + d4 = 1.
Note that, in the text it is assumed that ai = 1/2, bi = 1/2 for i = 1, 2, and ci = 1/4,
di = 1/4 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (See Bjorn and Vuong, 1984).
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Appendix C. Stackelberg Wife Leader Model
Outcome Probabilities in terms of Husband’s Reaction Functions and
Wife’s Utility Comparisons
Pr(0, 0) = Pr(H1, S1) + Pr(H2, S2)
Pr(1, 0) = Pr(H3, S3) + Pr(H4, S4)
Pr(0, 1) = Pr(H1, S1) + Pr(H3, S3)
Pr(1, 1) = Pr(H2, S2) + Pr(H4, S4)
Outcome Probabilities in terms of Model Parameters
If αh ≥ 0, then
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′wβw,−x
′
hβh, ρ)
− I(−x′wβw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − α1w,−x
′
hβh − αh, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(−x′wβw − α1w + α0w, x
′
hβh,−ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
wβw + α
1
w − α0w, x
′
hβh + αh, ρ)
− I(−x′wβw − α1w,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − α1w + α0w − αw,−x
′
hβh − αh, ρ)
otherwise
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′wβw,−x
′
hβh, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(−x′wβw − α1w + α0w, x
′
hβh,−ρ)
+ I(−x′wβw + α0w,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw − α1w + α0w,−x
′
hβh, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−ρ)
+ I(−x′wβw,−x
′
hβh − αh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w,−x
′
hβh − αh, ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
wβw + α
1
w − α0w, x
′
hβh + αh, ρ)
where Φ(a, b, ρ) is the cumulative distribution function evaluated at (a, b) of a bivariate
standard normal distribution with correlation ρ, I(a, b, c, d, ρ) is the integral of the
corresponding density over the range a ≥ εw, b ≥ εh.
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Appendix D. Stackelberg Husband Leader Model
Table D.1: Wife’s reaction functions
Reaction function Utility comparison Condition
W1: yw = 0 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) < Uw(0, 0) and εw < −x′wβw −max(0, αw)
yw = 0 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) < Uw(1, 0)
W2: yw = 0 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) < Uw(0, 0) and −x′wβw − αw < εw < −x′wβw if αw > 0
yw = 1 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0)
W3: yw = 1 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) > Uw(0, 0) and −x′wβw < εw < −x′wβw − αw if αw < 0
yw = 0 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) < Uw(1, 0)
W4: yw = 1 if yh = 0 and Uw(0, 1) > Uw(0, 0) and −x′wβw −min(0, αw) < εw
yw = 1 if yh = 1 Uw(1, 1) > Uw(1, 0)
Table D.2: Husband’s utility comparisons
Reaction function for the wife Utility comparison for the husband Condition
W1 C1: Uh(1, 0) > Uh(0, 0) εh > −x′hβh
W2 C2: Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 0) εh > −x′hβh − α1h
W3 C3: Uh(1, 0) > Uh(0, 1) εh > −x′hβh − α0h
W4 C4: Uh(1, 1) > Uh(0, 1) εh > −x′hβh − αh
Table D.3: Stackelberg Equilibria
W1 and C1 (1,0) W3 and C3 (1,0)
W1 and C1 (0,0) W3 and C3 (0,1)
W2 and C2 (1,1) W4 and C4 (1,1)
W2 and C2 (0,0) W4 and C4 (0,1)
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Outcome Probabilities in terms of Wife’s Reaction Functions and
Husband’s Utility Comparisons
Pr(0, 0) = Pr(C2,W2) + Pr(C3,W3)
Pr(1, 0) = Pr(C3,W3) + Pr(C4,W4)
Pr(0, 1) = Pr(C1,W1) + Pr(C2,W2)
Pr(1, 1) = Pr(C1,W1) + Pr(C4,W4)
Outcome Probabilities in terms of Model Parameters
If αw ≥ 0, then
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
− I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh − α1h + α0h, x
′
wβw,−ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh + α
1
h − α0h, x
′
wβw + αw, ρ)
− I(−x′hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h + α0h − αh,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
otherwise
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−ρ)
+ I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh + α
0
h,−x
′
wβw − αw, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh − α1h + α0h, x
′
wβw,−ρ)
+ I(−x′hβh + α0h,−x
′
wβw − αw,−x
′
hβh − α1h + α0h,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh + α
1
h − α0h, x
′
wβw + αw, ρ)
where Φ(a, b, ρ) is the cumulative distribution function evaluated at (a, b) of a bivariate
standard normal distribution with correlation ρ, I(a, b, c, d, ρ) is the integral of the
corresponding density over the range a ≥ εh, b ≥ εw (See Bjorn and Vuong, 1985).
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Appendix E. Nash/Pareto optimality Model
Outcome Probabilities in terms of Model Parameters
If α0h − α1h >= 0 and α0w − α1w >= 0:
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−ρ)
− 1
2
I(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh − α0h + α1h, x
′
wβw − α0w + α1w, ρ)
+ I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−ρ)
− 1
2
I(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
− I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
If α0h − α1h >= 0 and α0w − α1w < 0:
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh − α0h + α1h, x
′
wβw − α0w + α1w, ρ)
+ I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
+
1
2
I(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−ρ)
+
1
2
I(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w, ρ)
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
− I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
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If α0h − α1h < 0 and α0w − α1w >= 0:
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−ρ)
+
1
2
I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−x
′
hβh + α
0
h − α1h,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh − α0h + α1h, x
′
wβw − α0w + α1w, ρ)
+ I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
+
1
2
I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−x
′
hβh + α
0
h − α1h,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−ρ)
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
− I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
If α0h − α1h < 0 and α0w − α1w < 0:
Pr(1, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−ρ)
Pr(1, 1) = Φ(x
′
hβh − α0h + α1h, x
′
wβw − α0w + α1w, ρ)
+ I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
+ I(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw + α
0
w − α1w, ρ)
Pr(0, 1) = Φ(−x′hβh + α0h − α1h,−x
′
wβw,−ρ)
Pr(0, 0) = Φ(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw, ρ)
− I(−x′hβh,−x
′
wβw,−x
′
hβh − α1h,−x
′
wβw − α1w, ρ)
where Φ(a, b, ρ) is the cumulative distribution function evaluated at (a, b) of a bivariate
standard normal distribution with correlation ρ and I(a, b, c, d, ρ) is the integral of the
corresponding density over the range a ≥ εh, b ≥ εw.
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Appendix F. Labor Supply Elasticities of Married Men
Table F.1: Labor supply elasticities of married men by type of couples
Own Wife’s Non-labor
wage wage income
Homogamy-low 0.04 0.01 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Heterogamy-husband high 0.02 0.02 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Heterogamy-wife high 0.06 -0.02 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Homogamy-high 0.05 -0.01 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
All 0.04 0.00 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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